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Abstract: This paper addresses the Regulation on Electronic transactions in the internal market: 
electronic identification and trust services (eIDAS) and analyses this regulatory framework in 
relation to the pan European eID infrastructure being developed in the FutureID project. The aim 
of this paper is to identify if eIDAS sets forward any legal requirements that need to be 
implemented in the FutureID infrastructure. Even though the focus of this paper is on the 
development of the FutureID infrastructure, the description of eIDAS and the analysis of its main 
requirements for technical developers are in general relevant to the development of online 
identification and authentication schemes. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
With the possibility to use the Internet for an abundance of services, between all kinds of 
different actors - consumers, businesses and government - there is a current need for 
reliable online identity authentication. Most online service providers use registrations 
and then username/password systems for their identity management. Such systems are 
bothersome for the users since they have to remember a lot of different passwords. 
Moreover, such systems are not very reliable for service providers.  
Solutions for these problems can be found in a system of federated identity management, 
defined by Smedinghoff as an approach: “(…) where an enterprise engages in online 
transactions in reliance on identity credentials issued by any one of several third parties, 
and individuals can use the same identity credential to engage in transactions with 
multiple organizations.” In simple terminology; a system of federated identity 
management makes it possible to answer the questions: “Who are you?” and “How can 
you prove it?” [Sm12].  The existing EU identity management landscape mainly consists 
of private initiatives on the one hand (e.g. Liberty Alliance Project/Kantara, OpenID), 
with the most familiar identification mechanism probably being log in with Facebook, 
Twitter and Google+ accounts. On the other hand, there are national public electronic 
identity schemes, which are often considered to be more reliable and trustworthy. 
Examples are the German nPA, the Austrian Citizen Card, the Belgian eID and the 
Dutch DigiD. These national systems are commonly used for national e-government 
services. There also exist public/private partnerships, mostly between banks and the 
government, whereby the government accepts the private identity means for their e-
government services. This system is mostly used in the Nordic countries [St09]. Besides 
existing eIDs there is a lot of research on how to develop more trustworthy eIDs. 
Mention can for example be made of biometric authenticated transactions in eBanking 
and eBusiness, which is promoted by both the European Payment Council (EPC) and the 
European Banking Union (EBU) [Bu14]. 
In view of internationalisation - one of the characteristics of the online environment - 
electronic authentication services preferably are not confined to national borders. As the 
examples above illustrate, in a lot of EU Member States national eID systems are (being) 
developed, based on the use of eID cards.
1
 However, the legal international and 
European standardization
2
 of citizen cards lags behind in the early deployments of eID 
systems in Europe, such as in Germany and Belgium, leading to a very diverse landscape 
of different eID cards for which an infrastructure is needed that supports all these cards 
across Europe.
 
Different large scale EU funded projects aim to realize such 
infrastructure. In this respect mention can be made of projects such as: Stork, Stork 2.0 
and FutureID.
3
   
Besides all kinds of complexities and requirements regarding the technical development 
of the infrastructure, one other important design requirement concerns compatibility with 
existing legislation. In this paper we zoom in on a very recent legislative 
accomplishment, the Regulation on Electronic transactions in the internal market: 
electronic identification and trust services (referred to as eIDAS).
4
 Before addressing 
eIDAS in section 3, we will first in section 2 provide a brief introduction into the 
mentioned projects, and explain why we focus on the FutureID project. In section 4 we 
will analyse whether eIDAS provides requirements that need to be implemented in the 
FutureID infrastructure. The aim of this paper is to provide the technical developers 
some guidelines regarding these requirements. Even though this paper focusses on the 
development of the FutureID infrastructure, the description of eIDAS and the analysis of 
                                                          
1 Part III of the Stork D2.2 report provides country reports concerning eID systems in the Member States.  
2 CEN TS 15480 and ISO/IEC 24727. 
3 Available 12 May 2014 at www.eid-stork.eu/; www.eid-stork2.eu/;  www.futureid.eu/ 
4 Official Journal of the European Union, L 257/73, 28.8.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_257_R_0002&from=EN, available 10 September 2014. 
its main requirements for technical developers are in general relevant to the development 
of online identification and authentication schemes. 
2. EU eID projects 
 
2.1 Brief Introduction  
At the European level several projects are being carried out to develop a pan-European 
eID interoperability infrastructure.
5
 While all these projects have a different focus or 
application domain, the common denominator is that these projects function as “Pillars 
for the development of interoperability of cross-border eID and trust. Identifying and 
using appropriate mechanisms to develop and engage "communities" – citizens and 
SMEs in particular - in promoting the use and uptake of eID and trust services”.6 The 
three main projects concerning the development of a cross-border infrastructure are 
Stork, Stork 2.0 and FutureID. Within these projects reference is made to a fourth project 
in which the concept of Attribute-Based Credentials is explored: ABC4Trust.
7
 Attribute-
based Credentials allow in a scenario of authentication to reveal only the minimal 
information required (e.g. this person is over 18), without giving away full identity 
information (e.g. this person is born on 19-04-1972). These credentials thus facilitate the 
implementation of a trustworthy and at the same time privacy-protecting digital identity 
management system.
8
 
The project STORK
9
 (Secure IdenTity acrOss boRders linked) was finished in 2012. The 
results of the project showed that it is possible to use national eIDs in cross border use 
cases by designing a system with two possibilities: either using the middleware so the 
user can communicate directly to the foreign system or using a Pan European Proxy 
Service (PEPS) which acts as a single gateway and intermediary for foreign eIDs 
towards domestic Service providers [Wp14]. STORK 2.0 follows up on STORK and 
uses the system in additional pilots, including further also representation and mandates.
10
  
While the eIDAS Regulation most likely has been written with the results of the STORK 
project in mind, we will focus our analysis on the FutureID project, in which we are 
                                                          
5 Without the aim of being exhaustive mention can be made of the following projects: STORK 
(https://www.eid-stork.eu/), STORK 2.0 (https://www.eid-stork2.eu/), SPOCS (http://www.eu-
spocs.eu/index.php), PEPPOL (http://www.peppol.eu/), eCodex (http://www.e-codex.eu/home.html), 
epSOS(http://www.epsos.eu/). 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/connect/en/content/electronic-identification-and-trust-services-eidas-regulatory-
environment-and-beyond 
7 https://abc4trust.eu/ 
8 Available 12 May 2014 at https://abc4trust.eu/index.php/home/fact-sheet 
9 Available 12 May 2014 at www.eid-stork.eu 
10 Available 12 May 2014 at https://www.eid-stork2.eu/ 
involved as legal researchers. FutureID builds upon the findings in STORK and STORK 
2.0 while also including the implementation of Attribute-Based credentials. Roßnagel et 
al. describe the project as: “The FutureID project builds a comprehensive, flexible, 
privacy-aware and ubiquitously usable identity management infrastructure for Europe, 
which integrates existing eID technology and trust infrastructures, emerging federated 
identity management services and modern credential technologies to provide a user-
centric system for the trustworthy and accountable management of identity claims 
[Ro13]”. For users the interesting aspect of the project is that an eID is developed that 
can be used on ordinary desktop PCs, tablets and modern smart phones. From the 
perspective of service providers the advantage must come from an easy integration of 
existing services with the FutureID infrastructure. This will offer an effortless 
mechanism to benefit from strong security offered by eIDs without requiring service 
providers to make substantial investments. The idea is to offer the eID technology as a 
substitute for less secure alternatives currently in use such as username/password based 
systems. A third perspective described by Roßnagel et al. concerns existing and 
emerging trust service providers and card issuers “for which FutureID will provide an 
integrating framework, which eases using their authentication and signature related 
products across Europe and beyond.” 
2.2 Scope  
As described above, FutureID concerns an infrastructure integrating and linking different 
technologies, different (trust) service providers and different users to facilitate cross 
border online identification and authentication, and make the use of electronic signatures 
easier in the form of a common eSignature framework that is capable to process digital 
signature related tasks, like signature creation and verification, with which different 
existing formats of advanced electronic signatures can be used [LR13]. In this paper we 
refer to the FutureID infrastructure, meaning the components being developed and 
offered within the scope of the FutureID project, while realising that a complete eID 
architecture consists of more, e.g. the actual provision of identification and trust services 
in the strict sense of the eIDAS Regulation. We consider the FutureID project merely to 
offer the technical components that together form the infrastructure necessary for online 
authentication and electronic signatures. As such, FutureID is not an entity or legal 
person capable to provide e.g. qualified signatures or certificates. Therefore, the 
establishment and provision of trust services such as qualified signatures and certificates 
falls outside the scope of the development of the FutureID infrastructure, being the focus 
of this paper. This means that the eIDAS requirements pertaining such services, 
signatures and certificates, will only be dealt with considering the infrastructure 
provision of the eSignature service.
11
 
3. eIDAS 
 
3.1 Background 
The European Commission recognized the problem of not having a “comprehensive EU 
cross-border and cross-sector framework for secure, trustworthy and easy-to-use 
electronic transactions that encompasses electronic identification and trust services”.12 In 
this respect, its Digital Agenda established an action on mutual recognition of electronic 
identification to provide a comprehensive and predictable legal framework in view of 
boosting user empowerment, convenience and trust in the digital world.
13
 Providing such 
a legal framework is a necessary precondition to achieve modernization in public 
administration, mentioned in the European Commission’s ‘Annual Growth Survey 2013’ 
as “one of the five priorities for the Member States in the next 12-18 months (….). To 
underpin the digital transition in public services and to ensure they are available to all 
Europeans regardless of their place of residence, the Commission envisages deploying 
and rolling out digital services in key areas of public interest” [Ec12]. 
 
The revision of the eSignature Directive (1999/93/EC) started on the 4
th
 of June 2012 
with a proposal of the European Commission for a Regulation on electronic 
IDentification and Authentication Services (eIDAS). In February 2014 the 
representatives of the European Parliament (MEP), the Commission and the Council 
reached a political agreement regarding eIDAS.
14
 The proposed Regulation was adopted 
by the MEP with 534 votes in favor, 73 against and 7 abstentions, on the 3
rd
 of April 
2014.
15
 The Regulation has been adopted by the Council on the 23
rd
 of July 2014. It is 
officially published in the OJ on the 28
th
 of August 2014.
16
 The eSignature Directive will 
be repealed with effect from July 1, 2016, which is also the date from when the 
                                                          
11 E.g. we will not address the annexes I – IV of the Regulation concerning requirements for qualified 
certificates for electronic signatures, seals and website authentication, and requirements for qualified 
signature creation devices. 
12 Wording taken from the explanatory memorandum of eIDAS, available 12 May 2014 at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0238. 
13 See action 8 (revision of the eSignature Directive) in combination with action 83 (mutual recognition of 
electronic identification), available 12 May 2014 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-i-digital-single-market/action-8-revision-esignature-directive 
14 Available 12 May 2014 at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-151_en.htm 
15 Available 12 May 2014 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140403IPR41931/20140403IPR41931_en.pdf 
16 Official Journal of the European Union, L 257/73,  28.8.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_257_R_0002&from=EN 
Regulation shall apply.
17
 In order to make the transition smooth, some transitional 
measures are established. For example, qualified certificates issued under the eSignature 
Directive will be considered as qualified certificates until they expire.
18
 A certification 
service provider issuing qualified certificates has to submit a conformity assessment 
report and shall then also be considered as qualified trust service provider under the 
Regulation.
19
  
3.2 Main problems addressed by eIDAS  
Derived from the key actions in the Digital Agenda mentioned above, the Regulation 
wants to address two problems. The first is that citizens can’t use their electronic 
identification to authenticate themselves in another Member State because the national 
electronic identification schemes are not recognized in other Member States. This makes 
it difficult for all cross-border online services for which a higher level of trusted 
identification and authentication is necessary in order to be used, like for example cross-
border healthcare or online public procurement.  
The second problem that the Regulation will address is the diverging legal validity of 
trust services. Trust services are electronic services “which consist of: 
(a) The creation, verification, and validation of electronic signatures, electronic 
seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery services and 
certificates related to these services, or 
(b) The creation, verification and validation of certificates for website 
authentication; or 
(c) The preservation of electronic signatures, seals or certificates related to these 
services.”20    
One of the points of criticism on the eSignature Directive was that it only focuses on 
electronic signatures and leaves out other important trust services. This criticism has 
been taken up in the Regulation and it provides now also a framework for electronic 
seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic registered delivery 
services and certificate services for website authentication.  
3.3 Approach of the Regulation regarding the problem of electronic identity 
The Regulation does not try to introduce a common European electronic identification 
system. This would be problematic since identification of citizens is a core national 
                                                          
17 Art. 52 eIDAS. 
18 Art. 51 (2) eIDAS.  
19 Art. 51 (3) (4) eIDAS. 
20 Art. 3 (16) eIDAS. 
sovereignty. Instead, it provides for the possibility of cross-border use and mutual 
recognition of existing systems of the Member States by giving them the option to notify 
their electronic identification scheme to the Commission. The notification is only 
possible if the scheme fulfils certain criteria and is not obligatory for the Member 
States.
21
 Member States are obliged to accept notified identification means of others if 
their own online public services can be accessed by electronic identification means.
22
 
They can start joining the system from July 1, 2015.
23
 In section 3.5 we will discuss the 
liability regime regarding notified identification means. 
The obstacle in mutual recognition is that not all Member States identification means 
have the same security levels.  Member States, which have more secure means for 
accessing their online service, don’t want to accept less secure means of other Member 
States. To enhance the trust of the Member States in each other’s notified schemes the 
Regulation provides for 3 ‘Identity assurance levels’. These will be addressed in section 
4.3.  
3.4 Approach of the Regulation regarding Trust Services 
The Regulation now provides for a legal framework for electronic signatures, electronic 
seals, electronic time stamps, electronic documents, electronic registered delivery 
services and qualified certificates services for website authentication. This is a closed list 
of trust services, but Member States remain free to recognize at a national level other 
types of trust services as qualified and maintain or introduce national provisions to non-
harmonized trust services.
24
  
The non-discrimination rule of the Directive applies in the Regulation also to the 
mentioned trust services  (except the qualified certificates for website authentication), 
which means that those trust services can be used as evidence in legal proceedings.
25
 But 
it is still up to national law to define the legal effect of trust services, except where the 
Regulation states the effect.
26
 The Regulation permits for trust service providers 
complying with the Regulation to circulate their products freely in the internal market, 
but also includes liability of trust service providers, which will be discussed in the next 
section. Member States will establish trusted lists with information on the qualified trust 
                                                          
21 Art.7 and 9 and recital (13) eIDAS. 
22 Art. 6 eIDAS. 
23 Committees Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, Plenary sessions [03-04-2014 - 13:36] available 
12 May 2014 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20140403IPR41931/20140403IPR41931_en.pdf 
24 Recitals (25) and (24) eIDAS.  
25 Recital (22), art. 25, art. 35, art. 41, art. 43, art. 46 eIDAS. 
26 Recital (22) 
service providers.
27
 If a trust service provider is on such list it may use the EU trust 
mark.
28
 Qualified trust service providers will be supervised by a designated national 
supervisory body, which will also take action if non-qualified trust service providers 
allegedly do not meet the requirements of the Regulation.
29
 Section 3.6 will elaborate on 
the extended supervision in the Regulation compared to the Directive.  
3.5 Approach of the Regulation regarding Liability 
One of the crucial issues of eIDAS concerns the allocation of liability.
30
 Liability for 
trust services is rather straightforward. Art. 13 states that trust service providers are 
liable for damage caused to any natural or legal person due to failure to comply with the 
obligations under this Regulation. The intention or negligence of a qualified trust service 
provider shall be presumed unless a qualified trust service provider proves otherwise. 
The burden of proof regarding a non-qualified trust service provider lies with the 
claimant.  
More interesting and questionable is the liability provision of Art. 11 eIDAS. Besides 
strict liabilities for the party issuing electronic identification means and the party 
operating the authentication procedure, strict liabilities also pertain to notifying Member 
States.
31
 These Member States are liable for damage caused intentionally or negligently 
to any natural or legal person when the availability of online authentication is not 
ensured, or when it is not ensured that the person identification data uniquely represent 
the person in question. This only relates to cross border transactions in which it must be 
ensured that electronic identification means is attributed “in accordance with the 
technical specifications, standards and procedures for the relevant assurance level set out 
in the implementing act referred to in Article 8”.32 The liability of the notifying state has 
raised several critiques [DV12] [Vo13]. It is questioned whether the Member States will 
take responsibility for other parties than the State itself to provide online identification 
and authentication services. This does not conform to the market approach that is 
expressed in Recital 13 of eIDAS: “Member States should remain free to use or 
introduce means, for electronic identification purposes, for accessing online services. 
They should also be able to decide whether to involve the private sector in the provision 
of these means”. It could even lead to Member States abstaining to notify electronic 
identification schemes, blocking the possibility of mutual recognition of such systems. 
Dumortier and Vandezande from a different perspective point to barriers for private 
                                                          
27 Art. 22 eIDAS. 
28 Art. 23 eIDAS.  
29 Art. 17 eIDAS.  
30 Recitals (18) and (37). Art. 11 and 13 eIDAS. 
31 Art. 11 eIDAS. 
32 Assurance levels are discussed in section 4.3. 
parties to enter the online identification market, as service providers may have to make 
substantial investments in order to comply with the liability requirements [DV12].  
3.6 Approach of the Regulation regarding supervision 
The eSignature Directive referred to supervision only in one article stating that each 
Member State shall ensure the establishment of a supervision system for qualified 
certification service providers
33
, which resulted in a variety of supervision schemes in 
different Member States.
34
 In response to this the Regulation contains much more 
extensive supervision provisions, however, supervision in eIDAS is only specified for 
trust services. The supervision remains at the national level, so there is no European 
supervisory body, but Member States designate a supervisory body in their territory with 
the necessary powers and adequate resources.
35
 These supervisory bodies are considered 
to cooperate with each other and only in case of security breach with a cross border 
dimension ENISA will be informed.
36
 In general is it the role of the supervisory body to 
ensure that the requirements of the Regulation are followed by supervising qualified trust 
service providers and taking action in case non-qualified trust service providers do not 
meet the requirements.
37
 Penalties for infringements of the Regulation are up to the 
Member States assessment.
38
 To ensure the conformity of the qualified trust service 
providers they shall be audited at least every 2 years and additionally the supervisory 
body may always request another audit or audit themselves.
39
 The Commission may 
specify which standards should be followed for the audit.
40
 For electronic identity the 
Regulation provides no independent supervision system that would guarantee a uniform 
level of protection see [SRA13, p. 144][By13]. Even after the modifications of the 
Regulation this is still the case]  
 
 
4. Requirements of eIDAS for the development of FutureID 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section we address the requirements that can be derived from eIDAS that need to 
be taken into consideration in the technical development of the FutureID infrastructure. 
                                                          
33 Art. 3 (3) eSignature Directive.  
34 Feasibility study, p. 57.  
35 Art. 17 eIDAS 
36 Art. 18, art. 19 eIDAS.  
37 Art. 17 lid 3 eIDAS.  
38 Art. 16 eIDAS. 
39 Art. 20 eIDAS.  
40 Art. 20 (4) eIDAS.  
As explained and defined in section 2.2, we will focus the analysis of the requirements to 
the FutureID infrastructure. 
4.2 Privacy and Data Protection 
Privacy awareness and the need for adherence to strict privacy rules gained momentum 
in the development of eIDAS as can be witnessed by the fact that the current version of 
eIDAS, as accepted by Parliament, contains stronger data protection requirements than 
the original proposal of the Commission.
41
 Recital 11 concerns a general obligation to 
apply the Regulation in full compliance with the principles relating to the protection of 
personal data provided for in Directive 95/46/EC.
42
 Without addressing all the 
requirements that stem from this Directive, the recital does stress the need for data 
minimisation: “authentication for a service online should concern processing of only 
those identification data which are adequate, relevant and not excessive to grant access 
to that service online”. In relation to trust service providers and supervisory bodies 
eIDAS explicitly states that the requirements of confidentiality and security must be 
respected.
43
  
 
Article 12 of eIDAS concerns notified national electronic identification schemes. After 
establishing the requirement of interoperability of these schemes, the article requires 
further that the interoperability framework shall meet the following criteria in relation to 
data protection: 
 “(c) it shall facilitate the implementation of the principle of privacy by design; (d) it 
shall ensure that personal data is processed in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC”. 
Even though eIDAS stresses the need to incorporate privacy requirements into the 
architectural design of electronic identification schemes, the details of what these 
requirements entail are not part of eIDAS.  
 
It was even feared that some provisions of the eIDAS Regulation would prohibit the 
notification of special privacy advancing solutions, like the solution of the German nPA 
with mutual authentication requirement and user-centric transfer of personal data using a 
certificate that is subject to costs [By13] [Qu13]. Art. 6 about the notification 
requirements has been adjusted and, in the last version, no longer requires that the 
Member State ensures the availability of the authentication possibility at any time, free 
of charge and for any relying party, but restricts it for services online provided by a 
                                                          
41 Original proposal available 12 May 2014 at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0238:FIN:en:PDF. 
42 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L281/31. 
43  Recital 11 eIDAS. 
public sector body and specifies further that Member States shall not impose any specific 
disproportionate technical requirements on relying parties where such requirements 
prevent or significantly impede the interoperability of the notified electronic 
identification schemes (art. 7 (f)).   
 
Data minimisation, confidentiality and security are only a few of the requirements 
stemming from an extensive EU legal framework regarding data protection.
44
 All 
requirements of this legal framework must be taken into account in developing the 
FutureID infrastructure. However, it goes beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all 
the relevant data protection requirements. These requirements stem from a different legal 
framework, while the focus of this paper is to address requirements stemming from 
eIDAS. Moreover, the EU legal framework regarding data protection is currently under 
review, replacing Directive 95/46/EC with a Regulation. More clarity on the exact 
provisions of the Data Protection Regulation is expected later this year, or even next 
year, as the Council has postponed its hearing until after the elections of May 2014.
45
 
Presumably, the text the Council ultimately approves will contain amendments to the 
text adopted by the Parliament.
46
 In view of the explicit reference in eIDAS to the 
principles of privacy by design and privacy by default, we do want to stress the 
importance to try and build into the FutureID infrastructure privacy requirements that 
can be derived from the current and prospective EU legal framework regarding data 
protection.
47
 At this point in time, however, it is difficult to predict what the exact 
implications of these new principles will be. To give an example we point to the current 
developments in the Netherlands. Dutch government is still in the process of developing 
a coordinated, national system of electronic identities, including a publicly eID card with 
a high level of reliability. An interesting question the principles of Privacy by Design 
and Default raise, concerns the room for Dutch government not to make use of certain 
technologies, such as attribute based credentials, if experts agree such tools to be the 
most privacy-friendly solution. [Mi13] 
 
Besides the requirements pertaining to data protection, article 12 furthermore demands 
the interoperability framework to be technology neutral and non-discriminatory between 
any specific national technical solutions for electronic identification within the Member 
States. These requirements, just as data protection and privacy compliance, are explicitly 
                                                          
44 Currently consisting of Directive 95/46/EC, but also the ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC as amended by 
2009/136/EC) and the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC). 
45 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_nl.htm 
46 Text adopted by the Parliament available 12 May 2014 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_01-
29/comp_am_art_01-29en.pdf and 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/comp_am_art_30-
91/comp_am_art_30-91en.pdf. 
47 More on the revision of the data protection legal framework and privacy by design [Ku12] [CKP14]. 
stated to be the main goals of FutureID, and thus are an integral part of the technical 
development strategy of FutureID. A final requirement of Article 12 concerns the 
obligation to follow, when possible, European and international standards. This 
requirement is the subject of the next section.  
4.3 Assurance levels and standards 
Even though art. 12 does not in a strict sense oblige developers of FutureID to adhere to 
assurance levels and standards as some room is left in the phrasing: “when possible”, we 
do address them as it will offer great advantages to implement these assurance levels into 
the FutureID infrastructure since these levels will provide one common European 
system.    
Depending on the negative impact of a wrong authentication the risk level of a service 
can vary [Jø14]. For this reason different national governments and several EU projects 
defined frameworks that specify different Authentication Assurance Levels (AAL) for 
user authentication, to balance different levels of risk with corresponding appropriate 
authentication assurance [Jø14]. Also in eIDAS the EU legislator has defined 3 different 
assurance levels: “low”, “substantial” and “high”.48 “Low” provides a limited degree of 
confidence and its aim is to decrease the risk of misuse and alteration of the identity, 
while the purpose of “substantial” is to substantially decrease the risk.49 “High” will 
provide the highest level of confidence and its purpose is to prevent misuse or alteration 
of the identity.
50
 Only means with an equal or higher assurance level than the level 
required for the online service can be used to access the service, so it will not be possible 
to access a high level online service with low level identification means.
51
   
These criteria are quite vague and to specify them the Commission provides that, 
ultimately 12 months after entry into force of the Regulation, the Commission shall by 
implementation acts set out minimum technical specifications, standards and 
procedures.
52
 These shall be established by reference to the reliability and quality of the 
identity registration (identity proofing, issuance procedure, issuing entity), the 
authentication method (which mechanism is used) and the specifications of the issued 
electronic identification means.
53
 Despite the fact that no implementing acts are available 
yet, the direction in which these will go are clear. Recital 16 of the Regulation refers to 
                                                          
48 Art. 8 eIDAS. 
49 Art. 8 (2) (a) and (b) eIDAS. 
50 Art. 8 (2) (c) eIDAS. 
51 Art. 6 (1) (b) eIDAS.  
52 Art. 8 (3) eIDAS.  
53 Recital 16 and Art. 8 (3) eIDAS. See also [Jø14, p. 75].  
the Large Scale Pilot STORK
54
 and ISO 29115
55
 and inter alia, to their levels 2, 3 and 4, 
“which should be taken into utmost account in establishing minimum technical 
requirements, standards and procedures for the assurances levels low, substantial and 
high within the meaning of this Regulation, while ensuring consistent application of this 
Regulation in particular with regard to assurance level high related to proofing of 
identity for issuing qualified certificates.”56 eIDAS also states that requirements should 
be technology neutral and that “it should be possible to achieve the necessary security 
requirements through different technologies.”57  
The implication for pan European eID frameworks lies less in how the exact definition 
of the assurance levels is and more in the fact that there will be binding levels for 
notified eID means and that those will be specified. While in case of only national eID 
systems the service provider normally can assess the reliability and trustworthiness of 
their well-known own national eID, this is not the case for eIDs from other Member 
States. Therefore, pan European eID frameworks need to provide a solution for this 
problem and assurance levels are there for this reason. However, currently it is 
problematic that there are different assurance level systems and different ways to map 
them. The implementation acts of the Regulation will now set out three levels with 
hopefully clear specifications. Additionally, the Member States who notify their schemes 
must indicate the assurance level and they have to ensure that the means have been 
attributed to a person in accordance with the technical specifications, standards and 
procedures set out by the implementing acts.
58
 This provides a high grade of reliability 
for pan European eID frameworks and service providers. However this will still be only 
for government notified eID schemes, therefore a reliable system for private eID 
solutions is not defined by the eIDAS Regulation [SRA13 p. 45].  Nevertheless also 
private eID providers, whose schemes are not notified can use the assurance level system 
in cross-border situations, therefore the assurance levels can provide a framework also 
for not notified eID solutions.  
4.4 Usability 
To conclude this section on requirements, we address usability and user friendliness. 
Recital 47 of eIDAS states that: “Confidence in and convenience of online services are 
                                                          
54 Described in STORK D2.3, Quality authenticator scheme, available 12 May 2014 at https://www.eid-
stork.eu/index.php?option=com_processes&act=list_documents&s=1&Itemid=60&id=312. The STORK 
Quality Authentication Assurance (QAA) model defines 4 assurance levels (named 1: no or minimal assurance, 
2: low assurance, 3: substantial assurance and 4: high assurance).   
55 ISO/IEC 29115:2013 Information technology-Security techniques-Entity authentication assurance 
framework. ISO29115 provides also 4 levels of assurance (called LoA 1 low; LoA 2: medium; LoA 3: high and 
LoA 4: very high).   
56 Recital (16).  
57 Recital (16).  
58 Art. 9 (1) (a), art. 7 (e).  
essential for users to fully benefit and consciously rely on electronic services” (emphasis 
added). Even though this sentence is the introduction to create an EU trust mark, it also 
hints to usability and user friendliness as more general requirements in the development 
of online identification and authentication schemes. Article 15 of eIDAS concerns the 
usability of a specific group of users, as it requires, where feasible, the accessibility for 
persons with disabilities. This requirement does not only pertain to trust services, but 
also to end user products used to provide these services. This is an important 
requirement for the eSignature service of FutureID which should be taken into account.  
          
  
5. Conclusion 
 
eIDAS does not contain a lot of requirements directly relevant to the development of the 
FutureID infrastructure. This mainly relates to the scope of the FutureID project and the 
fact that a substantial part of eIDAS is focused on the actual provision of Trust Services. 
The main goals of the FutureID infrastructure align with important focus points of 
eIDAS, such as interoperability and compliance with data protection. Even though the 
relevance of eIDAS for the development of FutureID as such is limited, the implications 
of eIDAS for the overall pan European online authentication environment are 
substantial. At this point it is hard to predict whether eIDAS will indeed lead to a vivid 
cross border electronic identification and authentication landscape. The eSignatures 
Directive was stipulated as ‘used by few and ignored by many’ [DV08, p. 19], if this will 
change with the Regulation relates e.g. to the existence of actual use cases and how the 
liability regime of eIDAS will affect the mutual recognition of online identification and 
authentication schemes. Liability for notifying Member States may cause barriers for 
private parties to enter the market and could even lead Member States to abstain from 
notifying any scheme.  
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